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In a distributedmobile e-health care system, e-health service providers exchange data on the fly in response to user queries without
any centralized control. Local databases in e-health service providers might be intercepted during the exchange of data and read
by intruders; and malicious transactions may damage data that is highly confidential. In this case any centralized control for
securing data cannot be assumed to protect confidential data. Therefore, securing health information from malicious attacks has
become a major concern. Although prevention techniques are available, the history of system break-ins guarantees that there is
no foolproof technique that totally eliminates security loopholes in a computer system. Hence, efficient damage assessment and
recovery techniques are needed. Traditional methods require scanning the entire log from the point of attack to the end which is
a slow procedure. In this paper, we present an efficient damage assessment and recovery algorithm to recover the database from
malicious transactions.The algorithm is based on data dependency and uses a single matrix.The results of this work prove that our
algorithm performs better than the other algorithms in both the damage assessment and the recovery stages.
1. Introduction
Informationwarfare is one of themost effectiveweapons used
in today’s wars. It had many definitions throughout history.
In 1980, information warfare was used as a military term [1].
Then, it grew up to affect our life more during the Gulf War
in 1991 [1]. Libicki and Fellow [2] compared the definition of
information warfare to the process of discovering the nature
of an elephant by a blind man. If the blind man touched
the elephant’s leg, he will think that it is a tree, while if he
touched the tail, he will think that it is a rope. The aim of this
comparison is to say that information warfare has different
meanings and dimensions. It can be defined according to the
dimension that the person tackles.
In this research, information warfare is defined as the set
of mechanisms used to gain access to private information
using informationwarfareweapons such as computer viruses,
Trojan horses, logic bombs, trap doors, and denial of service
[3].
Securing data has become a crucial issue during the
web era because business applications are based on inten-
sive sharing of information through the internet. Defensive
information warfare passes through three phases in order
to secure data: prevention, detection, and recovery. The
prevention phase tries to prevent an attack on the database.
However, there is always a chance for a successful attack
on the computer system. As a legitimate transaction reads
damaged data to update valid data, damage will spread in
the database. When prevention fails, the intrusion detection
phase starts identifying the attack. Although there are numer-
ous researches in the intrusion detection area [4], existing
detection techniques cannot guarantee that the malicious
transaction will be detected immediately. Hence, until the
attack is detected, part of the database will be affected. Thus,
recovery will be needed.
Recovery is one of the main phases in defensive infor-
mation warfare because it ensures software tolerance. Upon
transaction processing, it reads and manipulates data items
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which in turn might be read and updated by other trans-
actions. This leads to interdependency between the trans-
actions. Hence, when a malicious transaction is detected
by the intrusion detection system, many transactions might
be affected after reading malicious data. All the affected
transactions must be rolled back to recover the database to
its consistent state. There are two issues to be considered in
order to have efficient recovery of the database. First, the
recovery process must be carried out in the shortest possible
time to minimize denial of service. Second, the accuracy of
the algorithm is a crucial issue in order to roll back only
affected transactions or affected data items.Thebenign part of
the database should stay available to the running applications.
In this paper, we propose new efficient damage assess-
ment and recovery algorithms that use a singlematrix to store
the dependency between data items in the log file. When an
intrusion detection system detects a malicious transaction,
the matrix will be used to identify the damaged data items for
later recovery. The algorithms do not need to scan the entire
log file in order to discover the affected part of the database.
This will cut down on damage assessment time. Using only
one data structure, thematrix, saves space and computational
time because there is no need for graphs or logical operations
as other approaches do. All of this increases the efficiency of
our approach over previously proposed ones.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 covers the literature review. Section 3 presents the
proposedmodel. Section 4 discusses the experimental results,
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
Damage assessment and recovery algorithms have been of
great interest to researchers in the last two decades. There
is always an intrusion detection system that detects the
malicious transactions. Then the recovery process starts,
where all the transactions from the malicious one to the end
of the log file should be assessed and classified into benign
or affected transaction. There are two approaches to do so:
data dependency and transaction dependency. Using the data
dependency approach, affected data items will be checked if
they were updated by an operation of amalicious transaction,
while using transaction dependency approach, a transaction
will be considered as affected if it reads a value that was
updated by a malicious transaction.
One of the previous approaches was the user isolation
approach [5]. This approach assumes that all the users are
malicious users until a certain period of time passes. Then,
the actions of the user will be identified as either malicious
and will be aborted or nonmalicious and will be committed.
Clustering the log file is also one of the suggested
approaches. In [6], the authors proposed segmenting the
log files into clusters. However, the size of the cluster was
a weakness because two different clusters may contain two
dependent transactions. This issue was solved in [7]. The
authors proposed segmenting the log file into clusters and
further subclusters. The clusters were subclustered according
to two different approaches: number of data items or space
occupied.
In [8], the authors suggested an agent-based approach,
where each agent is responsible for a set of data items. The
agents keep the version of the data item to help identify
whether it is affected or not.
Other approaches suggested using matrices in recovery.
In [9, 10], the authors used a matrix that saves transaction
dependencies. After each committed transaction, a new row
is added to the matrix. The cells of the matrix hold 0 value
in case there is no dependency, 1 in case of dependency, a
transaction ID in case there is a transaction that reads a data
item that was lastmodified by another transaction, and finally
a negative transaction ID if a data item was modified by a set
of transactions. In the last case a complementary array was
needed to save the list of transactions. The static allocation
of the matrix will cause a problem if the transactions and
data items grow in size.The difference between our work and
the work presented in [9, 10] is the fact that we will use only
onematrix without any complementary structures which will
save memory and execution time. In addition, we will use
data dependency instead of transaction dependency, which
locates more precisely the affected data items.
The authors of [11] suggested using column dependency.
The attributes of the database are referred to as columns. The
transaction takes into consideration the columns that were
read or modified by any operation of the transaction. This
approach decreased recovery time and showed that as the
number of malicious transactions increases, the number of
inconsistencies after reexecution will increase too.
Damage assessment and recovery for distributed data-
bases were suggested in [12]. The proposed approach keeps
a log file at each site, where there are two processes that
are responsible for damage assessment and repair: a local
DAR manager and a local DAR executor. Scanning the log
file is the responsibility of the local DAR executor that will
identify affected subtransactions and clean them.Thedamage
assessment and recovery algorithms work in parallel, which
in turn reduce execution time.
In [13], the authors suggested a recovery approach for
real time database systems based on transaction fusion. Upon
recovery, the malicious and the valuable affected transactions
are fused into new transactions based on their dependencies
and time limit. Transaction fusion reduced the number of
transactions which in turn reduced recovery time.
The Retro system was suggested in [14]. It is a self-healing
system based on transactional dependency and repairs the
database from intrusion at the operating system level. The
model performs selective recovery by undoing only suspect
transactions in order to reduce the effect of those transactions
as much as possible.
In [15], the authors propose a damage assessment model
that deals with new intertransaction dependencies: phantom
dependency, pseudoidentity dependency, domain integrity
dependency, and reference integrity dependency. They
describe their robust damage assessment approach and show
that in some cases the recovery is incomplete unless the
new proposed dependencies are considered. In [16], the
ITDM prototype model for damage assessment implements
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the damage assessment model described in [15] using SQL
rewriting.The SQL statements that are sent to theDBMSwere
modified in order to obtain the read/write dependencies.
They showed that exploiting the suggested intertransaction
dependencies of [15] leads to more consistency in the
database.
The Before Images approach was suggested in [17]. The
Before Image table is a table that is similar to the stored
table in the database but without constraints.These tables are
inaccessible by the users. This approach keeps track of the
deleted data items. When a data item is deleted or updated
in the initial table, a copy of the old record will be added
to the Before Image table that refers to the initial table. To
control the size of the Before Image table, a time window was
suggested for the deleted data items.When these items are out
of date, they will be deleted from the Before Image table. The
performance of the algorithm shows degradation due to the
queries performed on the Before Image table.
The authors of [18] propose a new approach that is based
on transaction reverse dependency log file. The transaction
reverse dependency log file is used to generate the Undo
Transaction Set (UTS). The authors present a recursive
algorithm for generating the UTS and another algorithm that
uses a stack.Then, they showed that the stack performs better
than the recursive one because recursive functions cause a lot
of overhead whenever the transaction number increases.
In [19], the authors propose that each application needs
its own type of recovery based on its nature. The authors
suggested a recovery algorithm for a banking system by
exploiting the deposit/withdrawal transactions.They reduced
recovery time by incorporating the semantics of the transac-
tions.The limitation of this approach is the fact that it cannot
be applied to any database system since it is not generic.
Fuzzy dependencies were suggested in [20]. The sug-
gested approach consists of “Fuzzy Value Generator” that
interacts with the database and the “fuzzy dependency
storage”.The advantage of this approach is the fact that it does
not require intensive search for transactional dependencies
in the log file. This boosts the recovery process. However, the
disadvantage of this approach is the lack of accuracy.
3. The Proposed Model
The proposed model is based on data dependency and uses
a matrix to store the dependencies between data items.
Data dependency is considered to be more accurate than
transaction dependency. The data dependency approach
identifies the affected data items by each operation of the
transactions and only deals with these data items upon
recovery. However, transaction dependency rolls back all
the affected transactions regardless of the operations that
compose the transaction. The proposed algorithm uses a
single matrix for identifying the affected data items during
the damage assessment process, which saves memory and
reduces recovery time.
3.1. Assumptions. Theproposedmodel is based on the follow-
ing assumptions. First, the algorithm will receive the set of
malicious transactions from an intrusion detection system.
Second, the history generated by the database management
systems is rigorously serializable as serializability theory
provides correctness. Third, there is a sequential log file
that saves all the read/write operations of the committed
transactions. This log file is inaccessible by users and will be
used upon recovery. Fourth, the transactions have sequential
IDs that are incremented on the arrival of new transaction.
This means that when transaction 𝑇
2
commits, then the only
transaction that has committed before 𝑇
2
is 𝑇
1
. Fifth, the
order of the operations is the same as the history. Finally, we
assume that the transaction log stores all the operations of the
committed transactions and stores for each write operation
the value of the data item before being updated.
3.2. Definitions
Definition 1. A write operation 𝑤
𝑖
[𝑥] of a transaction 𝑇
𝑖
is dependent on a read 𝑟
𝑖
[𝑦] operation of 𝑇
𝑖
, if 𝑤
𝑖
[𝑥] is
computed using the value obtained from 𝑟
𝑖
[𝑦] [21].
Definition 2. A blind write is when a transaction 𝑇
𝑖
writes
data item 𝑥 without reading the previous values of 𝑥 [22].
Definition 3. A write operation 𝑤
𝑖
[𝑥] of a transaction is
dependent on a set of data items 𝐼, if 𝑥 = 𝑓(𝐼); that is, the
values of data items in 𝐼 are used in calculating the new value
of 𝑥. If 𝑥 ̸= 𝐼, the operation is called a blind write. In this
case, if the previous value of 𝑥 (before this write operation) is
damaged and none of the data items in 𝐼 are damaged, then
the value of 𝑥 will be refreshed after this write operation [21].
Definition 4. A data value V
1
is dependent on data value V
2
, if
the write operation that wrote V
1
was dependent on a read
operation on V
2
. Note that V
1
and V
2
may be two different
versions of the same data item [23].
Definition 5. A transactionmanagementmechanism guaran-
tees rigorousness if it guarantees strictness, and no data item
is written until the transaction that previously read it either
commits or aborts [14].
Definition 6. A transaction 𝑇
𝑗
is said to be dependent upon
another transaction𝑇
𝑖
, if there exists a data item𝑥 such that𝑇
𝑖
is the last committed transaction to update 𝑥 before 𝑇
𝑗
reads
𝑥.The dependency relationship is denoted by𝑇
𝑖
→ 𝑇
𝑗
. Since
the schedule is assumed to be strictly serializable, there will
not be any active transaction writing 𝑥 between 𝑇
𝑖
updating
𝑥 and 𝑇
𝑗
reading 𝑥 [24].
Definition 7. A write operation is called a valid write if the
value is written by a benign transaction and is independent
of any contaminated data [25].
3.3. The Damage Assessment Algorithm. The proposed dam-
age assessment algorithm is based on data dependency. The
idea of this approach is to connect the data items together
to show the dependency between them. Then, the algorithm
will detect the directly affected data item(s) by the malicious
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transaction. After that, the algorithm will be able to find any
data items that are reachable by the malicious data items.
Those data items are called affected data items. Data items
that are not reachable by affected datawill be considered clean
and will be available to the user upon the recovery process.
A two-dimensional matrix will keep track of the depen-
dencies between the data items.Thismatrixwill directly point
out the affected data items without any need to scan the
whole matrix or the log file. Only one matrix will be used
to represent the dependencies. No other data structures or
logical operations are needed in the algorithm.
Initially, the matrix is empty. One of the transaction’s
operations is commot., a row will be added to the matrix to
represent this transaction and the data that this transaction
used to write the new values of the data items are added
as columns. Although data dependencies are the key of
the algorithm, saving the transactions will help accurately
identify the affected data items. The columns in the matrix
represent the data items used in the operation to write a new
value. Each cell in the matrix holds the data item that was
written by a given transaction.
Another feature that increases the efficiency of the pro-
posed algorithm is adding the first column to the matrix,
which is BW column or blind write column. It does not
correspond to a specific data item; instead, it will be used if the
transaction blindly wrote an item without reading any other
data item. The importance of this column will be revealed if
an affected data item was blindly written after being affected
and then it will become clean. This helps in reducing the
number of affected data items which in turn reduces recovery
time. Table 1 shows the matrix that will be generated after the
commitment of the transactions as follows.
Sample Transactions Set. Sample transactions set is as follows:
𝑇
1
: C := D.
𝑇
2
: D := D + 2.
𝑇
3
: A := B + 1.
𝑇
4
: B := C.
𝑇
5
: E := C + 3.
𝑇
6
: E := 3.
𝑇
7
: X := E + 5.
𝑇
8
: D := E + B.
𝑇
9
: Y := B.
In [26], the authors used multiple matrices for damage
assessment in order to discover dependencies which require
logical operations between the matrices. However, in our
approach, the single matrix reduces the damage assessment
time.
Assume that 𝑇
1
is the malicious transaction. 𝑇
1
writes the
data item C.Thus, C is responsible for spreading the damage.
We will go directly to the column labeled C in the matrix to
see the data items that are reachable by C. In this column,
B and E are affected data items. Thus, B and E will spread
the damage more. However, C was used in writing B and E
in transactions 𝑇
4
and 𝑇
5
. Since 𝑇
4
commits after 𝑇
1
, then,
Table 1: The dependency matrix.
Data items used in the transactions
BW D B C E
𝑇
1
C
𝑇
2
D
𝑇
3
A
𝑇
4
B
𝑇
5
E
𝑇
6
E
𝑇
7
X
𝑇
8
D D
𝑇
9
Y
the activity at 𝑇
4
will be checked. There is no need to look
at any transaction that precedes 𝑇
4
since damage spreading
started at 𝑇
4
. Data item A was written after reading B in 𝑇
3
but it will not be considered affected because 𝑇
3
committed
before 𝑇
4
. When 𝑇
3
committed, data item B was clean.
Considering the data item B, we will move to the trans-
actions 𝑇
𝑖
, where 𝑖 > 4, in column B to detect the data items
that were affected by B. In this case, we have D and Y. D and
Y will be added to the affected data items set. Considering
the data item E, we will move on to the transactions𝑇
𝑖
, where
𝑖 > 5, in column E to detect the data items that were affected
by E.The result should beX andD.However, we have an entry
for E in the first column of BW; thus, E was blindly written
before being used in writing X and D. Therefore, E became
clean before being used in transaction 𝑇
7
. Thus, X and D are
clean because theywerewritten after refreshing the value of E.
In this example, we ended up having C, B, D, and Y as affected
data items that should be recovered. The damage assessment
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. Assume that the
dependency matrix is called M and there is 𝑛-transactions.
The BW column has an index 0.
3.4. The Recovery Algorithm. During recovery, any executing
or new operation of a transaction should be prevented from
accessing malicious and affected data items. Only affected
operations of the transactions will be reexecuted. The other
part of the database will be available. The operations of mali-
cious transactions will be undone. The recovery algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 2.
3.5. Check Points. The matrix may grow and the data inside
it may become obsolete. Thus, to save memory, the above
algorithm requires a checkpoint to get rid of the matrix at
a specific time interval after which we suspect that the data
is clean and the malicious transactions were detected by the
intrusion detection system. This time interval should not be
too short in order not to need to go back to previous check
points and reread the log file. Additionally, it should not
be too long so that the size of the matrix and the log file
can be controlled. However, the intrusion detection system
may detect a malicious transaction after the check point. In
this case, the dependency matrix has to be reconstructed.
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Receive a set of malicious transactions 𝑆
While there is unprocessed transaction in 𝑆
Select the minimum unprocessed transaction id 𝑇
𝑖
in 𝑆
Identify the data items set D written by 𝑇
𝑖
Add D to the affected set
Associate with each data item the affecting transaction index 𝑖
For each unprocessed data item in the affected set
Find the index 𝑘 for the item
For 𝑗 = 𝑚 + 1 to 𝑛 //𝑚 is the transaction ID that affected 𝑘
If 𝑀[𝑗][0] = 𝑘 // the affected item is blindly written
Remove 𝑘 from the affected
Move to another data item in the affected set
Else If 𝑀[𝑗][𝑘] is not Null // Null means empty cell
Add 𝑀[𝑗][𝑘] to the affected set
Algorithm 1: The damage assessment algorithm.
Receive the set of malicious and affected data items
For each affected data item
Retrieve the operation from the log file
Update the value by the old value before the operation
Update the database
For each malicious data item
Retrieve the operation from the log file
Delete the operation
Algorithm 2: The recovery algorithm.
It will be time consuming if we reread the log file and
reconstruct the matrix. To solve this issue, we will keep a
compressed structure of the dependencymatrix that will help
in reconstructing thematrixwithout going back to the log file.
Since thematrix is a sparse matrix, the condensed storage
technique that we used is the Condensed Row Storage (CRS)
[26].TheCRS formatmakes no assumption about the sparsity
structure of the matrix and does not store any unnecessary
element of the matrix. Assuming we have an𝑀 × 𝑁 sparse
matrix𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗], containing nonzero (NZ) elements, theCRS
format is constructed as follows:
(i) One-dimensional vector 𝐴𝑁 holds all the nonzero
values of matrix 𝐴.
(ii) One-dimensional vector 𝐴𝐽 which has an equal
length to 𝐴𝑁 holds the column number of each
element (starting from 1).
(iii) One-dimensional vector𝐴𝐼 stores the locations in the
𝐴𝑁 vector that start a row.
Thus, the CRS of the matrix in Table 1 will be as follows:
𝐴𝑁 = [C D A B E E X D D Y].
𝐴𝐽 = [2 2 3 4 4 1 5 3 5 3].
𝐴𝐼 = [1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10].
These vectors will only be used in case we needed to
reconstruct the matrix after a check point. Since we assume
that the log file is rigorous and serializable, we will only
build the matrix starting from the malicious transaction.The
transactions that precede the malicious one do not need to
be recovered.The vectors will be refreshed at each new check
point to hold the values of the new matrix.
The CRS will only be built for one check point backward.
If in rare cases the intrusion detection system detected an
attacker before the check point of the CRS (worst case
scenario), then the log file will be used and the dependency
matrix will be rebuilt.
3.6. Example. Consider a database for health care manage-
ment system. We will only consider the process of keeping
patients records in the health care system. It contains infor-
mation about the following:
(i) Doctor (DrID, DrName, DrSpecialization).
(ii) Patient (PID, PName, PGender).
(iii) Disease (DID, DName).
(iv) PatientRecord (PID, DrID, DID).
(v) PatientBillItems (PBID, PID, Nitems, cost).
(vi) PatientBill (BID, PID, Nitems ∗ cost).
Consider the following insert transactions in the database:
(i) 𝑇
1
= Doctor (“1”, “Mike”, “Allergist”).
(ii) 𝑇
2
= Patient (“5”, “Hana”, “F”).
(iii) 𝑇
3
= Disease (“11”, “eye allergy”).
(iv) 𝑇
4
= PatientRecord (“5”, “1”, 11).
(v) 𝑇
5
= PatientBillItems (3, 5, 6, 150).
(vi) 𝑇
6
= PatientBill (2, 5, 900).
The dependency matrix 𝑀 will hold the dependencies of
the above committed transactions, as shown in Table 2.
The transactions 𝑇
1
to 𝑇
3
do not depend on any other
transactions. They are insert transactions; hence, they are
blindly written and will be stored in the first column of
the matrix BW. 𝑇
4
and 𝑇
5
are insert transactions but since
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Table 2: Sample matrix.
BW 5 1 11 6 150
𝑇
1
1
𝑇
1
Mike
𝑇
1
Allergist
𝑇
2
5
𝑇
2
Hana
𝑇
2
F
𝑇
3
11
𝑇
3
Eye allergy
𝑇
4
5 1 11
𝑇
5
3 5
𝑇
5
6
𝑇
5
150
𝑇
6
2
𝑇
6
5 900 900
they read values from other transactions and put them in
another table the data items will be considered dependent.
𝑇
4
reads from 𝑇
1
, 𝑇
2
, and 𝑇
3
. 𝑇
5
reads from 𝑇
2
. 𝑇
6
is an insert
transaction that reads from 𝑇
5
and writes a new value.
Consider the case where damage assessment algorithm
receives from the intrusion detection system that 𝑇
5
is a
malicious transaction. 𝑇
5
writes 3, 5, 6, and 150. After that
𝑇
6
reads 5, 6, and 150 to write 5 and 900. Then, from the
columns of the matrix, the data items 5 and 900 are affected
and will be added to the affected data set. The operation of
Nitems ∗ cost in 𝑇
6
should be rolled back and reexecuted. 𝑇
5
operations must be deleted.
4. Experimental Results
In order to test the performance of the algorithm, we created
a simulated system.This system creates random transactions.
When a transaction is committed, the log file will be updated.
The algorithm requires a dynamic dependency matrix that is
also updated after each committed transaction. The matrix
will be available during the damage assessment procedure.
The log file is required to be available during the recovery
process. The system generates random transactions and
accordingly creates the log file. The system is connected to
SQL server 2012. The Northwind database was used during
the experiments [27]. The simulation system is implemented
using Java programming language (JDK 1.6) on NetBeans
IDE 6.8. The computer system used is as follows: the proces-
sor is Intel Core i5 CPU 2410M at 2.3 GHz with 6GB RAM.
4.1. The Damage Assessment Algorithm Performance Analysis.
Figure 1 shows the time needed by the damage assessment
algorithm to discover the affected data items. 𝑥-axis shows
the transaction ID of the malicious transaction and 𝑦-axis
shows the time in microseconds. As shown in the figure, as
the transaction ID increases, the time required for damage
assessment decreases. This is one of the advantages of the
rigorous serializability of the log file. As the transaction ID
0
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Time
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m
e (
𝜇
s)
Figure 1: Performance time of damage assessment algorithm.
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Figure 2: Comparison of different damage assessment algorithms.
increases, there is no need to go back to the log file and check
the previous transactions. The log file contains 1080 records
and each record refers to a transaction. When the malicious
transaction ID is 500, the algorithm has to traverse only 580
transactions, whereas when the malicious transaction ID is
1000, the algorithm has to traverse 80 transactions only. This
decreases damage assessment time and in turn reduces the
system denial of service time.
We compared our algorithm to three other ones: tradi-
tional algorithm, traditional clustered algorithm, and hybrid
cluster algorithm. All the algorithms were tested in the same
simulation system that contains 200 transactions. Figure 2
shows this comparison. As shown in the figure, our algorithm
performs faster than the hybrid cluster one by 2218 times.
This comparison shows that our algorithm performs the best
among the four comparisons. This is due to the fact that our
algorithm is based on matrices which allow the algorithm 𝑚
to go directly to a specific index. In addition, using only one
data structure saved time because no logical operators are
needed. In addition, our algorithm does not need to refer to
the log file during the damage assessment stage.
4.2. The Recovery Algorithm Performance Analysis. The
recovery process starts when the damage assessment process
stops. The output of the damage assessment stage is a set of
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approaches.
affected data items to be recovered. Figure 3 shows the time
needed to recover the affected data items. As revealed in the
chart, as the number of data items increases, the recovery
time increases. The database consisted of 500 transactions.
Figure 4 shows the performance of different approaches in
the recovery stage. The chart shows the efficiency of our
algorithm. Our algorithm will refer to the log file records
using the index of the transaction. Indexing helps a lot in
saving the recovery time.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a new efficient approach of
damage assessment and recovery in databases. Our approach
is based on data dependency because it is more accurate than
transaction dependency. The dependencies between data
items are stored in a dynamic matrix that will grow as new
transactions commit and new data items are updated. Using
only one data structure in the damage assessment process
saves memory and processing time. Being able to directly
access the affected data items that are all present in one
column reduces processing overhead. All the aforementioned
properties of the approach make it efficient and reduce
recovery timewhich reduces denial of service of the database.
The algorithms were implemented and compared to other
approaches.
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